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VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
The Underwriter's Duty of "Due Diligence" Under Section 11
of the Securities Act: Reflections on BarChris
The Securities Act of 19331 seeks to protect the investing public
by putting into the hands of the potential securities purchaser
information upon which he can base an enlightened investing choice.'
The participants in a public distribution of securities-including the
underwriters-are required to collect, accurately and completely in a
registration statement and an accompanying prospectus, the relevant
facts about the company issuing the securities. Failure to do so will
render the participants liable under section I1 of the Act. The Act
then imposes a duty of care on the underwriter and enforces that duty
by the threat of civil liability. The liability imposed by section 11,
however, is not absolute. It can be avoided if the underwriter can
convince a court that he has been "duly diligent" in collecting the
facts.
*Before 1968 no judicial decision had specifically ruled on the
validity of an alleged "due diligence" defense. But in a recent
decision-Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.3-a federal district
court rejected the "due diligence" defenses of all the participants in a
securities offering, including the underwriters. The BarChris decision
has had a dramatic effect on the financial community. It has forced
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act employing section
numbers as in the original public act rather than as in the United States Code].
2. In broad outline, the Securities Act prohibits a prospective issuer from using the mails
or interstate commerce to sell or offer to sell securities unless a "registration statement" has
been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission containing certain required
information. Securities Act § 5(a). Some of the information must be incorporated into a
"prospectus" which must be delivered to each prospective investor either before or at the time
he receives the securities certificate. Securities Act §§ 5(b), 10. The information required in the
registration statement is set forth in Securities Act § 7.
During the "waiting period" after filing the registration statement, the issuer may make
offers to sell the securities (provided they are accompanied by a "prospectus"), but may not sell
any of the securities. Securities Act § 5(b). During the "waiting period" the SEC examines the
information and may require additions or clarifications. Securities Act §§ 8, 19. Once the
Commission feels that the information presented is not inaccurate, it allows the registration
statement to become "effective," after which the issuer may make sales to the public. Securities
Act § 5(a).
While the SEC carefully examines the material contained in the registration statement, it
does not guarantee the accuracy of the material. Consequently, should it later develop that a
registration statement became effective while containing material misrepresentations or
omissions, the Commission will issue a "stop order," which prohibits further sales until the
information is corrected. Securities Act § 8(d). Furthermore, any purchaser may bring an
action under the civil liabilities sections of the Act, including section II.
3. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (hereinafter cited as BarChris).
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investment bankers to re-evaluate their procedures for preparing
registration statements. At.the same time, it has led them to seek to
immunize themselves from the economic consequences of liability. In
the wake of the BarChris opinion, businessmen are looking upon
devices such as indemnification agreements and liability insurance
policies with increasing favor. Such devices, however, must be
critically examined since they may allow underwriters to escape from
their statutory duty of care. In light of both the policy behind the Act
and modern commercial practices, this note evaluates the duty of care
imposed on investment bankers by section 11, ways of complying with
it and methods of avoiding it.
I. SECTION I!: PURPOSE AND POLICY
Section 11 of the Securities Act permits "any person acquiring
[a] security" to sue the underwriters of an issue, among others, if any
part of the registration statement pertaining to the securities
contained, at the time it became effective, "an untrue statement of a
material fact" or omitted a material fact which made the information
presented misleading.4 Among those who may also be sued are all
signers of the registration statement, the directors of the issuing
corporation, and "experts" who prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement
While the issuer is held almost strictly liable for misstatements or
omissions,6 the other defendants may escape liability by affirmatively
proving "due diligence. ' 7 The Act provides that no defendant, other
than the issuer, may be held liable if he proves that he had, "after
4. Securities Act § ll(a). See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1721-42
(1961) (hereinafter cited as Loss).
5. Securities Act § II(a) also subjects to suit persons performing functions similar to
directors or partners of the issuer, § I l(a)(2): "every person who, with his consent, is named in
the registration statement as being or about to become a director, person performing similar
functions, or partner," § 1 l(a)(3); and every expert "whose profession gives authority to a
statement made by him who has . . . prepared or certified any part of the registration
statement," § I I(a)(4). An expert, however, may be subjected to liability only to the extent that
the inaccuracy in the registration statement "purports to have been prepared or certified by
him." Furthermore, only those who were directors and officers at the time that that part of the
registration statement containing the inaccuracy was filed are made liable. § II (a)(2).
6. The issuer may escape liability if he proves that the purchaser knew of the defect at the
time he purchased the security. Securities Act § 11(a). In addition, if the issuer "has made
generally available to its security holders an earning statement covering a period of at least
twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration statement," then the plaintiff
must prove affirmatively that he acquired the security relying on the registration
statement. § 11 (a), as amended. But the issuer is expressly denied the defenses of § II (b).
7. Securities Act § I I(b).
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reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe, and did
believe," that the registration statement was accurate and complete.8
Section 11 does not impose liability only on the defendant who
contributed the false or misleading information. Rather, it makes each
potential defendant liable for any inaccuracies occuring in any part of
the registration statement.' Thus, an underwriter can be held liable for
failing to discover a misstatement made by another party."°
The threat of such liability attempts to insure that each possible
defendant protects the investing public by making an independent
investigation into the truthfulness and completeness of the information
presented in the registration statement." Section 11 embodies a policy
decision that the investor is better protected by an accurate
registration statement than by the knowledge that he may sue to
recover his loss if the material is false. Thus, it seeks to regulate the
conduct of the participants, rather than to compensate the victim. 2
The theory behind section 11 is to insure the truthfulness of the
information given to the investor by imposing a duty of care upon
each participant in the preparation of the material and by policing
this duty with the threat of a civil liability3 which has been considered
penal in nature."
It must be noted, however, that the defendants, other than the
8. Securities Act § I I(b)(3)(A). Furthermore, no defendant, other than the issuer, may be
held liable for false statements or omissions made by an expert if, after reasonable investigation,
the defendant had "no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe" that the registration
statement was untrue or contained omissions. § I (b)(3)(C). The expert himself must show that
he believed that his statements were true. § I I (b)(3)(B).
9. An expert, however, is liable only for untruths or omissions in that part of the
registration statement which he prepares. Securities Act § I I (a)(4).
10. See Note, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section /I of the Securities Act of
1933, 72 YALE L.J. 406 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Indenutifcation oJ Underswriters].
I1. The Securities and Exchange Commission has recognized "the duty of thorough
investigation and analysis imposed by the Act on the underwriter proper." SEC Securities Act
Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938), 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1531.
12. For discussions of the policies behind the Act, written contemporaneously with the
Act's passage, see Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171
(1933); Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933). Both
commentators emphasize that the Act's purpose was regulatory, rather than compensatory.
13. Securities Act § 11(f) reinforces this regulatory policy by allowing every person held
liable to recover "contribution" from any other person "who, if sued separately, would have
been liable to make the same payment. ... The draftsmen of the Act were not satisfied by a
distant threat of liability, but rather sought to insure that those who owned a duty of care
suffered some economic sanction whenever a registration statement contained a misstatement or
an omission, unless due diligence was proved. Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems
Posed By Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARv. L REV. 1403, 1419 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as IndentniJication o1 Directors].
14. See note 105 infra.
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issuer, are not required to insure the accuracy of the registration
statement. The liability of. section 11 is not absolute. Since the Act
provides the due diligence defenses, it is possible for a registration
statement to contain inaccuracies which a "reasonable investigation"
would not have uncovered. But section 11 does require the underwriter
to examine the entire registration statement to avoid incurring an
economic penalty. The question, then, is what constitutes a
''reasonable investigation."
Section 11 (c) defines "reasonable investigation" as "the standard
of reasonableness . ..required of a prudent man in the management
of his own property."' 1 Professor Loss has noted that the adoption of
this standard was not intended to impose the same burden of
investigation upon all the potential defendants."6 But it is not clear
just what burden it was intended to impose. A Congressional report
declared only that the "duty of care to discover varies in its demands
upon participants in security distribution with the importance of their
place in the scheme of distribution and with the degree of protection
that the public has a right to expect ... .
The boundaries of the underwriter's due diligence defense are still
cloudy in view of the lack of cases decided under section 11.18 Before
1968 no case had expressly ruled on the reasonableness of the
underwriter's investigation, although in two previous Securities and
15. Securities Act § I I(c). As originally enacted, however, the standard of reasonableness
was that "of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship." 3 Loss 1726. The 1934 amendment
adopted the standard of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). "The amendment to
section I I(c) removes possible uncertainties as to the standard of reasonableness by substituting
for the present language the accepted common law definition of the duty of a fiduciary." H.R.
REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
16. 3 Loss 1730.
17. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1933).
18. Professor Loss noted that between 1933 and 1961 only eleven actions were initiated
under § II. 3 Loss 1687, 1688 n.l . Of these, only two resulted in liability for the defendants.
Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 726 (1937) (no evidence that
underwriters were defendants; all defendants who appealed were exonerated); Thorne v. Austin
Silver Mining Co., 171 Misc. 400, 12 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (underwriters failed to
disclose commitments and options on previously issued stock; no claim of due diligence).
Professor Loss's figures ignore the fact that many cases are settled out of court. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (court approved settlement of $775,000);
Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (court approved settlement of
$1,825,000); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1963) (court
approved settlement of $5,300,000); Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (dourt approved settlement of approximately $2,200,000). See also Wall St. J. (Sw. ed.).
Nov. II, 1968, at 4, col. 3 (investment bankers' settlement payment of $350,000 announced to
court). Even Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), has been
settled. Comment, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 122, 127 n.36 (1938).
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Exchange Commission proceedings, the SEC has commented on the
investigation made by the underwriters. In Charles E. Bailey & Co.,"
a proceeding to revoke a broker-dealer registration under section 15(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,0 the Commission rejected the
defendant's contention that his preliminary investigation was sufficient
and that the underwriter was not responsible for the prospectus
because it was based upon material provided by the issuer. The
Commission found that the underwriter had a duty "to exercise a
degree of care reasonable under the circumstances of this offering to
assure the substantial accuracy of the representations made in the
prospectus and other sales literature." 2' The Commission then noted
that the investigation was clearly inadequate, since the investment
banker knew of the issuer's financial difficulties, paid little attention
to back orders, and failed to insist on test results of the performance
of the issuer's risky new product line.
The Richmond Corp.22 was a proceeding under Securities
Act section 8(d) to determine whether a stop order should issue. The
managing underwriter in this case visited two of the company's three
tracts of land, examined the shareholder list and obtained a credit
report. For all other information, however, the underwriter relied on
the issuer. Despite the fact that the underwriter was not before the
Commission, the SEC remarked that "such a limited investigation
by an underwriter does not measure up to the degree of care,
reasonable under the circumstances, necessary for and required of an
underwriter to satisfy himself as to the accuracy and adequacy of the
representations in the prospectus." 3 The SEC pointed out that the
investing public judges the worth of a securities offering partly on the
reputation24 of the investment banker. By allowing his name to be
used on the prospectus, an underwriter "impliedly represents" that he
has investigated the accuracy of the material and is satisfied with its
truthfulness. "The underwriter who does not make a reasonable
investigation is derelict in his responsibilities to deal fairly with the
investing public." z This was the unsettled state of prior authority
before the decision in BarChris was handed down. With that decision,
19. 35 S.E.C. 33 (1953).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(b)(5) (1964).
21. Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33, 41 (1953).
22. 41 S.E.C. 398 (1963).
23. Id. at 405.
24. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 43 (Israels & Duff
eds., 1962).
25. The Richmond Corp., 41 S.E.C. 398, 406 (1963).
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the financial community was forced to evaluate carefully the
"reasonableness" of its practices. 21
1I. ESCOTT V. BARCHRIS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
A. Background
BarChris Construction Corporation was primarily engaged
in constructing bowling centers.27 During the period of increased public
interest in bowling which followed the introduction of automatic pin-
setting machines, BarChris's sales rose "dramatically. 28  When a sale
was made, BarChris would generally execute a contract with a
customer and, after receiving a small down payment, construct the
center. The customer would then finance the remainder of the
purchase price in one of two ways. Usually he executed notes for the
balance which BarChris discounted with a factor (Talcott). However
under the so-called "alternative method," BarChris sold the center's
interior shell (alley and restaurant facilities) to the factor who would
lease it either to the customer directly (Type A) or to a BarChris
subsidiary which would in turn sublease it to the customer (Type B).
Since either method required BarChris to finance the construction
before it was paid, BarChris was constantly in need of cash. In 1961,
to satisfy this need, BarChris sought to issue to the public 3.5 million
dollars worth of convertible subordinated debentures 9 A registration
statement and accompanying prospectus, which was filed on March
30, 1961, became effective on May 16, 19617 o In October of 1962, the
company entered bankruptcy proceedings.
That same month in 1962 nine disappointed debenture purchasers
brought a class action,3' alleging that the registration statement
26. For the effect of BarChris on the financial community, see Wall St. J., May 14, 1968,
at I, col. 6 (Sw. ed.); FORBES MAGAZINE, Sept. I, 1968, at 23.
27. The centers were rather elaborate. "They contained not only a number of alleys or
'lanes,' but also, in most cases, bar and restaurant facilities." BarChris, at 653.
28. According to the prospectus, net sales amounted to $800,000 in 1957, $1,700,000 in
1958, and $3,300,000 in 1959. The 1960 net sales figure-$9,165,000-was found to be
misleading. BarChris, at 653.
29. BarChris had sold 560,000 shares of common stock to the public in December of 1959
at a price of $3 per share. BarChris, at 654.
30. Before becoming effective, the registration statement was amended twice-on May I I
and May 16. BarChris received the proceeds of the offering on May 24, 1961. BarChris, at 654.
31. The nine original plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and "all other and present
and former holders" of the debentures. Subsequent to the institution of the suit, other plaintiffs
were permitted to intervene. At the time of the trial, over sixty plaintiffs had joined in the suit.
BarChris, at 652. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub. norn. Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1965) (commencement of action by some
plaintiffs tolled the statute of limitations both as to themselves and others similarly situated).
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violated section 11 by containing material false statements and
omissions. Joined as defendants were the signers of the registration
statement,32  eight investment banking firms 3  and the independent
certified public accountants. 34
1. Unaudited Balance Sheet.-The court found many material 5
defects in the registration statement. Among them were several
misrepresentations which appeared in the unaudited balance sheet for
the quarter which ended on March 31, 1961. First, BarChris
understated certain contingent liabilities. If customers defaulted,
BarChris was liable, under the alternative financing method, for 25 per
cent of the remaining purchase price if the factor had leased the interior
to a customer (Type A), and for 100 per cent if the factor had leased to
a BarChris subsidiary (Type B).36 The company, however, stated its
contingent liability under the alternative method at 25 per cent for all
-transactions.3 7 Second, by including intercompany transactions in
sales, the company overstated net sales and, consequently, gross profit
and net earnings for the period. Third, BarChris overstated the
"backlog," the amount of unfilled orders which existed on its books;
it did this by including unenforceable contracts for alley construction
32. Among those sued were BarChris's president (Vitolo) and its vice-president (Pugliese).
The court noted that they were men of "limited education" who were not "equipped to handle
financial matters." BiarChris, at 653. Also sued were the executive vice-president (Russo),
treasurer (Kircher), comptroller (Trilling), and secretary (Birnbaum). In addition, four outside
directors were made defendants. One was a banker (Auslander), one a civil enginer (Rose), one a
lawyer with the firm representing BarChris (Grant), and one a partner of the managing
underwriting firm (Coleman). BarChris, at 652.
33. Drexel & Co. was the managing underwriter. Also participating in the offering were:
Hemphill, Noyes & Co.; Paine, Weber, Jackson & Curtis; Salomon Brothers & Hutzler; G.H.
Walker & Co.; Baird & Co., Inc.; Ira Haupt & Co.; and Peter Morgan & Co.
34. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. audited BarChris's financial statements as of Dec. 31,
1960. A young accountant (Berardi), not yet a Certified Public Accountant, did most of the
audit work. BarChris, at 698.
35. The term "material" has been defined by the SEC as "the information required to
those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before
purchasing the security registered." Rule 405(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(I). A material fact has
been further defined as "a fact which if it had been correctly stated or disclosed would have
deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the securities in
question." List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
36. Under its normal financing arrangement, BarChris was liable to the factor for 50, of
the total unpaid balance if a customer defaulted on its notes. BarChris, at 664.
37. The court noted that BarChris correctly computed its contingent liability under its
normal financing plan. However, in addition to stating at 25% what should have been stated at
100%, BarChris stated as a contingent liability the percentage for a lane which was leased by
one BarChris subsidiary to another subsidiary. The court declared that this should have been
treated as a direct liability. BarChris, at 665.
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and by including sums "due" under contracts which had been
cancelled.
2. Text of the Prospectus.-The court also found four material
misrepresentations in the text of the prospectus itself. First, a
statement that loans from certain officers to the company had been
repaid was false, both because the officers failed to deposit payment
checks until after BarChris had received the proceeds from the issue
and because the prospectus failed to mention that these officers were
made new advances shortly prior to the effective date. Second,
BarChris failed to use the proceeds from the offering in the manner
stated in the prospectus. In fact, the court found, it used the proceeds
to pay off many of its concealed debts38 and to satisfy construction
creditors. Third, Judge McLean determined that the company had
given the false impression that its "problems with customers' credit
and performance were minimal." Actually, Judge McLean declared,
"nothing could have been further from the truth." 39 In fact, BarChris
was in grave danger of being forced to repurchase over 1,500,000
dollars worth of defaulted notes. Finally, the company misrepresented
its operations by failing to disclose that it was operating alleys as well
as constructing them.40
3. Audited Balance Sheet-Current Assets.-Finally the court
noted that, for four reasons, the 1960 audited balance sheet overstated
the corporation's current assets. First, pursuant to the normal
financing plan, Talcott, the factor, held certain reserves as security for
the customers' notes. Before the audit was prepared, and at the
request of the company's executive vice-president, Talcott released a
reserve of 147,466.80 dollars t6 a BarChris subsidiary. After it was
included on the consolidated balance sheet, this sum was then repaid
to the factor. Second, the company included as an account receivable
the full amount of a down payment owed by a financially troubled
customer. The proper accounting treatment of this item, Judge
McLean declared, would have been to create a reserve of 50,000
38. The company argued that the application of proceeds section was not misleading
because other funds came in which were utilized for the purposes specified in the registration
statement. The court rejected this defense, finding BarChris's proof inadequate. BarChris, at
675.
39. BarChris, at 677-78.
40. Not only did the company fail to disclose this fact, it also neglected to mention that it
soon would be operating other alleys which had been repurchased due to customer defaults.
BarChris, at 678.
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dollars." Third, the balance sheet included a 150,000 dollar account
receivable for a lane which had never been sold to an outside buyer.
Such sales to its own subsidiaries were intercompany transactions and
should not have been included on the consolidated balance sheet.
Fourth, the court objected to the company's including, as a current
asset, the entire reserve held by Talcott. While he agreed that the
amount was an asset, Judge McLean classified it as non-current
because the sums were released to BarChris only as the customers
paid their notes.
B. Due Diligence Defense
All the defendants, including the managing underwriter, Drexel &
Co., contended that after they had made a "reasonable
investigation," they reasonably believed the registration statement to
be correct 2
In testing the standard of "due diligence" against the actions of
the underwriters, 3 Judge McLean emphasized that since section 11
was intended to protect the investing public, each potential defendant
owed an independent duty to the public. He reasoned that since
company officers tend to make "unduly enthusiastic" statements to
underwriters to induce them to handle the offering, the underwriters
must protect tie public by investigating rather than accepting these
statements.44 He noted that this was especially true of the underwriters
41. The plaintiffs argued that the reserve should have been the full amount due (S 125,000).
Judge McLean, although noting that "this question of adequate reserves must be determined in
the light of the facts as they existed at the time, not as they later developed," ruled that a
reserve of $50,000 was sufficient, without elaborating his reasons. BarChris, at 662.
42. There is a lesser burden of due diligence with regard to the "expert" portions of the
registration statement. There was some confusion in the answers to the complaint as to just
which portions had been prepared by experts. Some of the defendants contended that only the
accountant was the expert. Others claimed that the lawyers were also experts. Judge McLean
held that only the accountant was an expert within the meaning of § II and that only the 1960
certified financial statement was "expertised." BarChris, at 683-84. See note 8 supra. Judge
McLean did find that the underwriters satisfied the due diligence defense with regard to the
"expertised" financial statement. BarChris, at 697.
43. Judge McLean did not require each defendant to make the same investigation. He
declared that "in considering Grant's [BarChris's lawyer] due diligence defenses, the unique
position which he occupied cannot be disregarded." Since Grant, as company counsel, drafted
the registration statement, "more was required of him in the way of reasonable investigation
than could fairly be expected of a director who had no connection with this work." BarChris, at
690. The court's discussion of the underwriter's due diligence defense appears at BarChris, at
692-97.
44. "An underwriter has not put the company's officers 'into a position of trust for the
express purpose of attending to details of management.' The underwriters did not select them. HI
a sense, the positions of the underwriter and the company's officers are adverse." BarChrls, at
NOTES
because of their role in the distribution process.15 Judge McLean
found it "impossible to lay down a rigid rule suitable for every case
defining the extent to which such verification must go," but concluded
that the underwriters in BarChris were not duly diligent when they
made "almost no attempt to verify management's representations." 46
To reach this conclusion, Judge McLean examined the
investigation which the underwriters had actually made. The
managing underwriter had delegated most of the duties of
investigation to its counsel "as its agent" and was then bound by the
failure of its counsel to make an adequate investigation.4 7
Coleman, a partner of Drexel & Co., was first introduced to
BarChris Construction Corporation on September 15, 1960. Prior to
Drexel's agreement to underwrite the issue, Coleman made a
preliminary investigation of the company. He read the prospectus of
BarChris's 1959 stock offering, its annual reports and unaudited
financial statements, as well as recent prospectuses of the company's
principal competitors. In addition, Coleman received favorable
assessments of the company's financial situation from Dun &
Bradstreet and Talcott. Also, he conducted his own interviews with
BarChris officers.
In mid-March of 1961, Coleman and Ballard, his attorney,
attended three meetings at which a first draft of the prospectus was
696. One commentator has noted that only the underwriter and the accountant can easily
assume such an adverse role since they can resist the pressures to be blindly optimistic and
possess the facilities and competence to perform adequately an independent investigation.
Furthermore, the SEC does not have the manpower to investigate the truthfulness of the
statements in the registration statement. See Note, BarChris: Due D'ligence Refined, 68 COLUtM.
L. REV. 1411, 1421 (1968). Recently the SEC has attempted to streamline its procedures for
processing registration statements. wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1968, at 2, col. 3-4.(Sw. ed.). The
Commission attributed its inability to process effectively all of the statements to the increased
number of public offerings and a reduced personnel due to federal budget cuts. Consequently,
the SEC is seeking to shift the responsibility for adequate disclosure to the issuer. " 'It's the
issuer, not the SEC, that investors should turn to for verification of prospectuses,' Charles E.
Shreve, director of the agency's corporate finance division said. 'We only clear these things as a
service to the cornpanies.'" Id. This view reflects an increased emphasis on the underwriter's
responsibilities and the increased influence of the in terroren policy.
45. "The underwriters say that the prospectus is the company's prbspectus, not theirs.
Doubtless this is the way they customarily regard it. But the Securities Act makes no such
distinction. The underwriters are just as responsible as the company if the prospectus is false.
And prospective investors rely upon the reputation of the underwriters in deciding whether to
purchase the securities." BarChris, at 696.
46. BarChris, at 697.
47. For a discussion of the duty of reasonable investigation of sub-underwriters, see notes
76-81 infra and accompanying text.
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discussed. 48 Apparently all the relevant questions were asked and
settled during these meetings. Coleman and Ballard received answers
which satisfied them as to the adequacy of the 1960 reserve figures,
the "use of proceeds" information, the contract "backlog" figure, the
down payment figures, -the proper treatment of customer
delinquencies, the company's possible operation of bowling alleys, and
officers' loans.
On April 17, 1961, Coleman became a director of the company.
Assuming that Ballard was attending to the accuracy of the
prospectus, Coleman made no further investigation of this matter.
In'April, Ballard sent Stanton, a young lawyer who had never
before worked on a securities offering, to examine the company's
minutes and its "major contracts."49 Stanton spent one day in the
company's offices where he read the Board minutes, the available
executive committee minutes and the minutes of "a few" subsidiaries.
He learned.that there were other un-typed executive committee
minutes, but did not ask to see them. The only major contract which
he examined was an insurance policy. In his reading of the executive
committee minutes, Stanton noted that an officer had stated that
"because of customers' defaults, BarChris might find itself in the
business of operating alleys." '5°
Stanton reported his findings to Ballard who, in turn, asked a
company officer about the missing executive committee minutes, the
incomplete minutes of one subsidiary, and the statement about
operating alleys. The officer replied that the missing minutes were
insignificant and that the chance that the company would operate
alleys was "merely hypothetical." Without further investigation, an
amendment to the registration statement was prepared; this became
effective five days later.
Judge McLean found this to be an inadequate investigation.
Stanton's investigation was deficient because he failed to read all the
relevant minutes. Had he done' so, he would have discovered that
BarChris was already operating one alley and was contemplating
operating others. Furthermore, Stanton had failed to examine all the
important contracts. Consequently, he failed to appreciate the true
48. Present were Grant (except on two days when another lawyer took his place), the
company's treasurer, Coleman and Ballard. A representative of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
was present at one of the meetings. BarChris, at 693.
49. Stanton was performing what has been termed a "hallowed tradition" of sending
young lawyers to check the dusty corporate records. See notes 67-68 infra and accompanying
text.
50. BarChris, at 694.
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contingent liability to Talcott under Type B financing or the
inaccuracy of the "backlog" figure. Finally, he had not examined any
accounting records.
Coleman and Ballard also failed to establish their due diligence
defense. Ballard had failed to insist that the missing minutes be
produced, he had failed to examine the factor's agreement and
customer contracts, and he had not asked to see the company's
schedule of delinquencies. He had also neglected to examine
BarChris's correspondence with the factor, and had made no new
inquiry about officer loans (despite the insistence of one officer that
the Trust Indenture give loans from individuals priority over the
debentures). Had these steps been taken, the court concluded, the
omissions and misrepresentations contained in the propsectus would
have been discovered. Furthermore, since Coleman had delegated
Ballard as his agent, Coleman's own defense rested with the
reasonableness of Ballard's investigation.
III. SECTION I1: STANDARD OF CONDUCT
A. The Need For More Specific Standards
The BarChris decision has produced a howl of protest in the
business community.5 l "Honest Abe Lincoln could lose a shareholder
suit today," grumbled one lawyer.52 What has most distressed
businessmen is the possibility of being held liable when they had no
intent to deceive, as well as the lack of clear standards by which to
guide themselves against negligent conduct. Said one: "You have to
be candid, careful, lucky, and have an attorney watch your every
move. Even then you can't be sure that you might not lose a
shareholder suit." ' 53 The real problem, then, is to determine when an
underwriter's investigation is reasonable.54 In view of the severity of
section I1 liability, the standards should be clearly defined.
Although Judge McLean did not articulate specific requirements
of a "reasonable investigation" for underwriters, such guidelines are
clearly necessary. 5 Without them, uncertainty in the business
community may hinder commercial practice. Furthermore, investment
51. See note 26 supra.
52. FORBES MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 1968, at 25.
53. Id.
54. Judge McLean himself admitted that the application of the requirement of due
diligence to the facts of each case was "a question of degree, a matter of judgment." BarChris.
at 697.
55. See note 44 supra.
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bankers may react with an "overabundance of caution" and incur
unnecessary expenses which will be passed on to the issuer, thus
making access to the capital market more difficult5
Because the in terrorem effect of the BarChris decision will
increase the likelihood that section 11 suits will be settled, it is
unlikely that such guidelines will come from the courts.57 One
commentator suggests that authoritative guidelines be devised, either
by the SEC pursuant to its rule-making power, or by the investment
banking industry through the establishment of standards for its
profession. If not superseded by further legislation, such guidelines
would probably be respected by the courts.58
B. Standards of Due Diligence in BarChris
The basis of Judge McLean's determination of liability was that
an underwriter who accepts the representations of the issuer without
attempting to verify them has not made a "reasonable investigation."
"The way to prevent mistakes," he elaborated, "is to test oral
information by examining the original written record." 59 Had this
been done, the court held, the misrepresentations would have been
discovered.
There is very little which is surprising in the holding in the case.
As applied to the facts in BarChris, Judge McLean's decision is
correct. Upon examination, the underwriters' investigation is difficult
to justify as reasonable. Had all the minutes been carefully read,
Ballard should have learned of the "backlog" miscalculation, because
the matter of unenforceable contracts was discussed. At this point he
should have become suspicious and asked to see the contracts which
comprised the backlog. He should also have questioned the default
situation in view of the comment about operating alleys. A check of
the schedule of deficiencies would have confirmed his suspicions. The
unread minutes would also have informed him of the fact that
56. Note, supra note 44. See also note 83 injra and accompanying text.
57. Note, supra note 44, at 1421.
58. Id. at 1427. The SEC's rule-making power is conferred by Securities Act § 19.
Underwriters could follow the example of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants which has developed standards for accepted accounting practice. For a discussion
of the use of such accounting standards, see Note, Accountants Liabilities for False and
Misleading Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1464-68 (1967J.
59. BarChris, at 690. This statement was made in connection with the defense of Grant,




BarChris actually was operating one alley. Furthermore, a study of
the minutes or the financial statements would have revealed the
intercompany sales. A careful reading of all major contracts,
especially the factor's agreement, would have exposed the contingent
liability misrepresentation. When an officer demanded that loans from
individuals be given priority over the debentures, Ballard should have
asked to see the cancelled checks to confirm whether the officers'
loans had in fact been repaid."
It would have been more difficult to find specific written
information indicating the company's intent not to use the proceeds in
the way specified in the prospectus. But the opinion must be read
cumulatively. Had the other material misrepresentations been
discovered, it is inconceivable that the use of proceeds section would
have gone unchallenged. BarChris's serious financial difficulty would
have been exposed; this would immediately have raised the use of
proceeds question.
The seriousness of the misrepresentations and the almost total
absence of investigation make the value of the BarChris decision to
the investment banker and his counsel difficult to discover. What light
does the opinion shed on the underwriter's duty to make a
"reasonable investigation?" Hopefully, BarChris will support the
proposition that proof by an underwriter that he carefully and
critically assessed all oral representations and made a serious effort to
examine all relevant written information will satisfy the "due
diligence" defense.
C. Investigation Guidelines
"The decision is likely to mean that everyone connected with a
registration will be much more meticulous than in the past," reported
the Wall Street Journal. It noted that "Law firms and underwriters
. . . already are revising their standards in light of Judge McLean's
tougher standard of what constitutes a 'reasonable' measure of
care." What procedures for exercising care can be devised which
meet the rationale of the BarChris decision?
62
60. For a discussion of the difficulties in obtaining the "written record' from company
officials, see notes 73-75 infra and accompanying text.
61. Wall St. J., May 14, 1968, at I, col. 6 (Sw. ed.).
62. In the preparation of the following discussion, the writer has utilized several
memoranda. of law from law firms with large securities practices. These firms remain
anonymous at their own request. The writer, however, wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to
these firms. See also lsraels, Checklist For Underwriters' Investigation: Addendum-1968 Escott
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The initial protection for the investment banker is the careful
screening of securities offerings before making the decision to
underwrite. Initially, the underwriter should make a preliminary
investigation of the issuer and its industry. Reading earlier
prospectuses and trade publications, inquiring of financial institutions,
and interviewing company officials are minimum requirements. 3 It
should be noted that Judge McLean did not criticize the preliminary
investigation made by Coleman in any way. Before making the
survey, underwriters should review and formalize the methods they use
in deciding whether to manage an issue; considerations include the
standards employed, the extent of the investigation and the persons
authorized to make the decision. Before committing itself, an
underwriting firm should detail its operating procedures to the
prospective issuer, making clear exactly what the underwriter demands
of the issuer. The firm should require and obtain assurances of the
issuer's total cooperation in satisfying the due diligence defense. Such
cooperation should include access to company minutes, contracts and
other relevant files.
64
Once the underwriter decides to manage the issue, it is important
to prepare time schedules which allow sufficient latitude for
conducting the investigation. The preparation of the initial registration
statement and subsequent amendments for the SEC is generally done
under pressure. As described in BarChris, lengthy conferences occur
during which drafts are reviewed, discussed, and revised. 5 The time
schedule should provide sufficient time for the underwriter to review
the final proof of each document before it is filed.
During these drafting sessions, many questions are asked of
company officials and accountants. The oral answers become the
v. BarChris Construction Corp., in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SELECTED ARTICLES ON
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 65 (1968); Riordan & Wragg, Examination of Corporate Books In
Connection With Stock Offerings and Acquisitions, 18 Bus. LAW. 677 (1963).
63. At least one investment banking firm investigates prospective issuing corporations and
their officials through a private detective agency.
64. One commentator sees BarChris's lack of candor as the most disturbing element of
the case. "From the underwriters' standpoint BarChris emphasizes the necessity for confidence
in the management of the issuer above and beyond its willingness fairly (and satisfactorily) to
answer all inquiries made. It calls for a relationship which gives fullest assurance that the
smallest cloud on the horizon will be immediately reported, tracked and its potential destructive
effects assessed as best they may be. Managements which, like that of BarChris do not merit
that degfee of trust cannot, unfortunately be classified as extinct. Nor can underwriters who
despite their best endeavors, nevertheless can be misled by such a management. There will be
more litigation under Section 11 of the 1933 Act. We have not heard the last of BarChris."
Israels, supra note 62, at 73.
65. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
NOTES "
basis for a substantial part of the registration statement. While the
-court in BarChris made it clear that this oral information must be
tested against the written documents, to interrupt these already
lengthy conferences is obviously impractical. Therefore, a better pro-
cedure would be to take careful notes of the questions raised and the
answers given during the meetings. Then, during the interim between
the filing of the statement and the receipt of the letter of comments from
the S EC, the investment banker should independently verify the infor-
mation contained in the registration statement. Thus, any inaccuracies
discovered can be corrected by amendment before the statement be-
comes effective.
The work to be done during the investigation should be divided
between the underwriter and the lawyer.6 But however it is divided, all
involved should re-read the registration statement and review the notes
of the conferences. A list should be prepared of all items in both the
registration statement and the notes, which the underwriter may then
verify either from a review of corporate records or from outside
sources.
At this point either the underwriter or his attorney should visit
the offices of the issuer to examine company records. 7 The quality of
the men making this search is important. Judge McLean indicated
that Stanton was inadequately prepared since he had never worked on
a securities offering before and had been a member of the bar for only
six months. "The decision could well end what one lawyer wryly calls
the 'hallowed tradition' of sending junior lawyers to check the records
of a, company offering securities. ' 68 The general purpose of the search
has usually been to determine whether the shares are duly authorized,
validly issued, and fully paid. Is the corporation duly incorporated?
Are there any unusual or burdensome commitments not previously
disclosed? In addition the lawyer should read the minutes of the
Board of Directors,. Executive Committee, any other committees and
66. The lawyer's particular province traditionally includes such areas as the validity of the
securities, material contracts, litigation, patents, property rights, and governmental regulation.
The underwriter's province includes fact-finding functions, such as the accuracy of the
description of the property, the salaries for management, and the description of the business. But
in BarChris, Judge McLean noted that the lawyer performed both functions, and this is often
the case.
67. See Riordan & Wragg, supra note 62.
68. Wall St. J., May 14, 1968, at 1, col. 6 (Sw. ed.). In light of the manpower demands
on large legal firms, it is questionable whether this "hallowed tradition" has in fact ended. At
the least, however, the preparation of the younger attorney is now more extensive and his
findings more carefully checked than in the past.
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shareholders meetings from the last five years. If any such minutes
are missing, the lawyer should demand that they be produced.
Evidence of the compliance made by the company should be reported.
Specifically, the lawyer should look for any references to the
following:
(1) Any difficulties of a financial nature such as unfavorable cash flow,
decline in sales, slow receivables, and customer defaults;
(2) Anything which indicates that the proceeds of the offering will not be
used as provided in the registration statement, or that there are pressing demands
which must be met;
(3) Anything which suggests that the company is engaging, or is about to
engage in any business not described in the registration statement;
(4) Difficulties created or contemplated by increased or new competition;
(5) Earnings reports which are at variance with any of the earnings
statements in the statement;
(6) Transactions with officers, directors, or controlling stockholders which
have not been disclosed or have been inadequately disclosed;
(7) Material contracts which have not been filed as exhibits to the
registration statement; and
(8) In general, anything which suggests a material misstatement or
omission from the registration statement.
During the course of the investigation, the person making the
search should review all debt instruments and loan agreements, with
special emphasis on default provisions. The terms of such documents
should be checked against their description as found in the
registration statement. All contracts mentioned in the statement
should be carefully read and checked against the description of them.
Furthermore, the searcher should make a general review of the
company's correspondence files with key outsiders, such as its
counsel, principal creditors and principal customers. These files should
be examined for references to the problems outlined above. Finally a
check should be made to insure that all buildings and equipment
comply with their description in the registration statement. As with
corporate minutes, evidence of the cooperation which the underwriter
receives from the company should be noted and should bear on the
reasonableness of the verification.
Before the registration statement becomes effective, a further
investigation must be made to make certain that material changes
occurring between the first filing of documents with the SEC and the
effective date are reflected. There are many ways to accomplish such
an "updating." One method is continuous communication with
company officials, counsel and accountants, including, where
appropriate, intensive cross-examination of them. Whenever
possible, the results should be confirmed by reference to any
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authoritative written materials. In addition, many of the techniques
used in the original investigation may be re-employed.
Two final methods of verification have been cast in doubt by
BarChris. The first method, officers' and directors' questionnaires,
has been considered fairly reliable in the past. But Judge McLean
indicated that dependence on the answers of the issuer is not
satisfactory. Therefore, it would seem that such questionnaires can be
used only to gather information which must then be verified. If they
are used for this purpose, however, it is suggested that these
questionnaires be as detailed as possible; the language, however,
should not be too intricate to be easily understood.
Neither does the due diligence meeting, the second method, seem
to meet Judge McLean's criterion for'study of original, written
documents. Professor Loss has admitted that such meetings may not
be a valuable safeguard. 9 Such gatherings are generally attended by
the issuer's officials, its counsel, underwriters and their counsel,
accountants and other experts. "Everybody is thus afforded an
opportunity to exercise 'due diligence' by asking questions."7
According to Judge McLean, merely to ask questions is clearly not
due diligence. Often the due diligence meeting is simply a perfunctory
meeting over cocktails. But one commentator suggested that the
meeting can still be useful in keeping open the "channels of
communication between the lead underwriter and the members of the
group. . . . "7
While an underwriter will not be held liable for inaccuracies in a
certified financial statement if he had reasonable belief that the
financial statement was correct, both the audited and unaudited
financial statements should be reviewed for possible
misrepresentations. The most practical way to verify the unaudited
financial statements is to delegate the duty to the accountants and
then to rely on their "cold comfort" letter. Nevertheless, if the
underwriter's own examination raises suspicions, the matter should be
pursued despite this "comfort" letter.
At every stage in the process of investigation and verification, the
69. 3 Loss 1731.
70. Id.; PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 24, at 155-56 describes the "due diligence
meeting" as "an attempt to meet a statutory test." The meeting "provides a means for the
proposed underwriter and others to ask questions which they feel they should ask and which go
beyond the prospectus, at times which go beyond the written material which. may have been
made available to them." Id.
71. lsraels, supra note 62, at 73. For a discussion of the sub-underwriters' due diligence,
see notes 76-81 infra and accompanying text.
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underwriter personnel and the attorneys should carefully document the
procedures followed and the results obtained." They should collect
evidence of the cooperation which the underwriter received from other
parties. If requested documents are not produced, such information
should bear on the reasonableness of the investigation.
An effective due diligence investigation can be accomplished only
with the total cooperation of the issuer, because of the issuer's access
to and control over many of the documents which must be examined.
While the investment banker should obtain assurances of cooperation
from the issuer, practical difficulties can be anticipated. Certain
material may be confidential for legitimate business reasons, and the
company executives may balk at producing it. ". 'We'd get fired if we
asked to see the backlog contracts,' said one Wall Street lawyer."73
Furthermore, material may simply be unavailable.74 If such
information either cannot or will not be produced, there is little an
underwriter can do to compel its availability. The availability of the
documents should bear on the reasonableness of the investigation
required by section 11. But if the underwriter seeks to examine
relevant records and is unnecessarily denied access to them, he should
be prepared to refuse to continue with the offering. While the
underwriter should not be held strictly liable for the contents of
unproduced material, this should not encourage issuers to foil a
diligent investigation by refusing to produce damaging information.
At some point, the underwriter should be put on notice that all is not
being disclosed.
Normally, however, the issuing corporation and the investment
banker will desire to cooperate with each other to prepare an accurate
registration statement. It is in the best interests of the issuer and its
officers to cooperate fully with the underwriter. Not only are they still
subject to liability, but they will also lose the benefit of the
underwriter's contribution if he subsequently establishes his defense
and they do not. But managements which, like that of BarChris, are
72. One New York firm recommends that "proofs with notations thereon . . . be retained
permanently. Accurate and complete diaries or entries reflecting conferences and telephone calls
are most important."
73. Wall St. J. (Sw. ed.), May 14, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
74. O&e Wall Street lawyer has interpreted "[Jiudge McLean's strictures as to backlog
[as] directed to the specific facts of BarChris. They cannot seriously be construed to require that
underwriters attempt an independent check of the backlog of a manufacturing company which
might well consist of hundreds, even thousands of purchase orders." Israels, supra pote 62, at
71. It is also possible that older minute books of old corporations may be lost. Conversation
with James H. Cheek, Ill, Assistant Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law, Nov. 6, 1968.
['VOL. 22
NOTES
either disinterested in full disclosure of relevant facts or are
consciously seeking to hide adverse information still exist, 5 and
underwriters must be aware of them.
The lesson of BarChris, then, is that while an underwriter must
make a reasonable investigation, this should not mean that he must
detect all misrepresentations and omissions. On the other hand, the
underwriter should not be allowed to accept the word of others at face
value. Rather, BarChris should stand for the proposition that, in so
far as possible, suspicious facts must be checked against the original
written record. Consequently, if the procedures just outlined are
conscientiously followed, a court should determine that "due
diligence" has been established.
D. Problems of the Sub- Underwriters
The preceding discussion has concerned itself with problems the
managing underwriter encounters in the public offering of securities.
In practice, however, it is common commercial procedure for the sub-
underwriters, each of whom buys a portion of the total number of
securities, to rely on the activities of the managing underwriter.78 The
sub-underwriter does not prepare the registration statement, and he is
not involved in the distribution process until after the closing. That is,
he makes no due diligence investigation, but rather relies on the
investigation of the head underwriter.
In BarChris, since the head underwriter failed to establish his due
diligence defense, the sub-underwriters also failed to establish their
defenses.77 But section 11 declares that "every underwriter" can be
sued, and it says nothing about the right of one underwriter to rely on
the statements of another. In fact, BarChris supports the proposition
that every defendant must independently verify the truthfulness of the
registration statement. Does this then mean that each underwriter,
regardless of his position in the underwriting group and regardless of
the fact that he did nothing to prepare the registration statement,
must make a separate "due diligence" investigation?
But would the lack of any investigation by the sub-underwriters
render them liable even if the lead underwriter successfully established
his defense? Judge McLean expressly declined to answer this
question." There is, in fact, nothing in the Act which expressly deals
75. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
76. 1 Loss 547, 553-55; PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 24, at 153-54.
77. BarChris. at 697.
78. BarChris. at 697 n.26.
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with this problem. But to demand that the sub-underwriters make
their own investigations seems unreasonable7 While sub-underwriters
are "participants" in the distribution process, they are not
independent participants. Rather, they are members of an
underwriting "group" directed by the managing underwriter. A more
reasonable approach, it would seem, would be to treat the entire
underwriting group as a single entity. To do so would not lessen the
chances for an accurate registration statement, since sub-underwriters
do not help to prepare the statement anyway. In addition, requiring
each underwriter independently to verify the registration statement's
accuracy would be so expensive as to make the cost of public
distribution prohibitive for small companies.
It would be a simple matter to eliminate the necessity for sub-
underwriters to make separate investigations by delegating the head
underwriter's attorney as agent for all the underwriters. A successful
investigation on behalf of one underwriter, then, would protect them
all. In BarChris, Drexel, the lead underwriter, delegated its attorney,
as its agent, to make most of the due diligence investigation." The
court allowed this delegation of authority and held Drexel liable for
the failures of its agent. As a matter of common practice, the
agreement among the underwriters grants to the managing
underwriter broad powers to approve the registration statement, to
postpone the effective date, and to manage the issue generally.8 ' In
effect the agreement among the underwriters is a delegation of
authority to the managing underwriter, and it would be merely a
matter of legal draftsmanship to delegate the due diligence
investigation of all the underwriters to the head underwriter's lawyers.
IV. THE ESCAPE FROM LIABILITY
A. Indemnification
The threat of great liability 2 has led investment bankers to seek
to protect themselves in several ways. To the extent that they have
79. "This holding, more than any other in the decision, upsets Wall Streeters. It's
'downright silly' to expect participating underwriters to make an independent investigation, says
a lawyer who otherwise praises the decision. 'That's what the lead underwriter is for.' " Wall
St. J., May 14. 1968, at I, col. 6 (Sw. ed.).
80. BarChris, at 697.
81. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 24, at 86.
82. Securities Act § I I(e) limits the underwriter's liability to the "total price at which the
securities underwritten by him and distributed to the public were offered to the public." But the
amounts involved are still great. See, e.g., Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y.
[*V OL. 22
NOTES
protected themselves by adhering more carefully to the statutory duty
of examining the entire registration statement, the purpose of the Act
has been accomplished 3 But underwriters have also sought to protect
themselves in other, arguably less responsible, ways-by immunizing
themselves from the economic consequences of liability through use of
indemnification agreements and liability insurance policies. 8
It is customary that the underwriting contract contain provisions
between the issuer and the underwriter whereby each promises to
indemnify the other against any liabilities growing out of any
misstatement or omission on his part. That is, the underwriter
warrants the truthfulness only of that information which he provides!'
Consequently the underwriter takes no risk for statements which he
does not supply. In view of the fact that the registration statement
text is normally prepared by the issuer's counsel, with the underwriter
adding only such facts as the offering price, discounts, and modes of
distribution, under an indemnification agreement the underwriter
takes very little risk indeed8
These mutual indemnification contracts, however, conflict with
the policy behind the Act, which is to force several independent
verifications of the accuracy of the entire registration statement. Since
the indemnification agreement limits the underwriter's economic risk
to only a part of the registration statement, such provisions appear
1966) (settlement of $1,825,000); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48 (D.
Mass. 1963) (settlement of $5,300,000); Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (settlement of approximately $2,200,000).
83. It is not completely clear that the threat of liability will inevitably benefit the investing
public. "The result could be higher legal fees in underwritings, higher cost for liability insurance
in such offerings and, perhaps greater selectivity by underwriters in bringing out new issues."
Wall St. J., May 14, 1968, at I, col. 6 (Sw. ed.). The result, then, could be a denial of the
capital markets to smaller ventures-clearly not an end sought by the federal securities acts.
Even if smaller companies can find an investment banker who will handle the offering, the
cost-through a greater underwriting "spread"-may be prohibitive.
84. The Wall Street Journal reported that liability insurance policies are increasingly
sought and increasingly harder to obtain. One insurance official noted that "The percentage of
turndowns for this type of insurance is unusually high." Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1968, at I, col. I and
p. 7, col. 3 (Sw. ed.). The cost of these policies is often prohibitive. See note 98 ira.
85. See Note, supra note 10; PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra'note 24' at 84. Such
provisions have become so common in underwriting contracts that they have been inserted almost
automatically. For a representative provision, see Lockwood & Anderson, Underwriting Contracts.
Within Purview oj Securities Act oj 1933; with Certain Suggested Provisions, 8 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 33, 55-58 (1939).
86. Note, supra note 10, at 406. It should be noted that Drexel & Co. could not obtain in-
demnity from BarChris, because BarChris went into bankruptcy. BarChris, at 654. In this situation,
the underwriter's liability increases, since the issuer is unable to contribute pursuant to Securities
Act § Il(Q.
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clearly contrary to public policy.87 Regulation of conduct is the
primary purpose of section 11, and to allow the underwriter
indemnification would be to relieve him of the economic consequences
of his breach of statutory duty; this, consequently, would defeat the
regulatory purpose of the Act. "[S]ince the effect of indemnification
is to shift all the liability for any given statement to the indemnitor,
the likelihood of multiple verification is decreased." 8
Until 1968, no court had ever voided an indemnification
provision on the grounds that it violated public policy. But in Globus
v. Law Research Service, Inc.,89 a federal district court did void such
87. "Thus, it becomes clear that section II is a vital part of the congressional regulatory
scheme with which indemnification, if permitted, would interfere." Note, supra note 13, at 1419.
Curiously neither the securities statutes nor the SEC regulations expressly prohibits the indemnifi-
cation of underwriters. Section 14 of the Securities Act voids: "'any condition, stipulation, or pro-
vision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance" with the Act. Securities Act
§ 14. Section 14, then, applies only where potential plaintiJs agree not to sue. While the underwriter
"'purchases" the securities from the issuer for distribution to the public, he is best seen as a partici-
pant in the distribution process-he is a potential defendant, not a plaintiff.
process-he is a potential defendant, not a plaintiff.
The SEC expresses no objection to the stan'dard indemnification agreement between issuer
and underwriter. But under Rule 460, the Commission will deny acceleration if "directors,
officers, and controlling persons" may be indemnified unless the prospectus reveals this fact in
language specified by the SEC. Rule 460(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.460(a) (Note) (1968). However,
the Rule considers irldemnification of underwriters against public policy only where "a director,
officer or controlling person of the registrant is such an underwriter." Rule 460(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.460(b) (Note) (1968). Therefore only when a member of the investment banking firm is a
"director, officer, or controlling person" of the issuer is indemnification of the underwriter
condemned. Indeed the SEC Corporate Finance Division's Chief Counsel has verified this
position: -[I]t is usual practice to indemnify underwriters, and the Commission is not
concerned with the indemnification of underwriters as such." Statement by Charles H. Shreve,
quoted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 24, at 147.
Professor Loss suggests that the distinction between the indemnification of corporate
officers and the indemnification of underwriters arose because of the fear that underwriters
would be unwilling to assume the full risks imposed upon them by § II. 3 Loss 1835. This
distinction has been criticized in Note, supra note 10.
88. Note, supra note 10, at 410-1I. This argument would lose its force if the underwriter was
successful in establishing his defense. Since any policy objection. to indemnification would be
that it detracted from one's diligence in making a reasonable investigation, such objections would
disappear in the face of a successful defense. If the defendant has shown that he maintained the re-
quired standard of care, no purpose could be served by denying the defendant the right to recover
his defense expenses.
It has been argued that defense expenses should be recoverable without regard to whether
the defendant is adjudged to be liable. "The liability or fine is levied in large measure according
to the defendant's fault, a process of adjustment which is essential to its appropriateness as a
regulatory device. Litigation expenses, on the other hand, vary according to the quality and
difficulty of the defense asserted and have no necessary relation to the degree of misbehavior
involved." Note, supra note 13, at 1411.
89. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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a provision. 0 Law Research, a corporation which provided legal
research services by computer, issued stock in a Regulation A
offering 9 This transaction was underwritten by Blair & Co. Under
the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts," a suit was brought,
based upon the omission from the offering circular of the fact that
Sperry Rand, from whom Law Research leased computer time, had
terminated its contract. Sperry Rand was no longer providing such
services and was, in fact, planning to litigate the matter.
3
A jury found that the defendants, including the underwriter,
actually knew of the omission, and it assessed both compensatory and
punitive damages against all the defendants. The jury also granted
Blair indemnification under the terms of the indemnification
provision. Judge Mansfield, however, set aside the award with these
words:
After reviewing the matter this Court believes that it would be against the public
policy embodied in the federal securities legislation to permit Blair & Co., which
has been found guilty of misconduct in violation of the public interest involving
actual knowledge of false and misleading statements or omissions and waftton
indifference to its obligations and the rights of others, to enforce its
indemnification agreement . . . . If an underwriter were to be permitted to
90. The Underwriting Agreement "obligated Law Research to indemnify Blair & Co. for
any loss arising out of any untrue statement of a material fact in the Offering Circular, except
that Blair was not to obtain indemnification by reason of any willful misfeasance, bad faith or
gross negligence in the performance of its duties or by reason of its reckless disregard of its
obligations and duties under the agreement." Id. at 198.
91. Regulation A was adopted by the SEC pursuant to its authority under Securities Act
§ 3(b), which expressly allows the Commission to add any class of securities to those exempted
from the requirement of registration up to an amount not to exceed $300,000. To comply with
Regulation A, the issuer must file a "notification" pursuant to Rule 255, 17 C.F.R. § 230.255
(1968) and an "offering circular" pursuant to Rule 256, 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (1968). Both the
"notification" and "offering circular" are much briefer than their counterparts, the registration
statement and prospectus. Nevertheless the same prohibitions against misrepresentations and
omissions are present. Rule 261(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.261(a)(2) (1968) gives the Commission
the authority to suspend the exemption if any literature filed contains inaccuracies of material
facts. See generally I Loss 609-34; Glavin & Purcell, Securities Offerings and Regulation
A-Requirements and Risks, 13 Bus. LAW. 303 (1958).
92. The suit was brought under Securities Act § 17(a) (general anti-fraud provision in the
sale of securities), Securities Act § 12(2) (sale of securities through use of a misleading
prospectus or oral communication), Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(j)(b) (1964) (general anti-fraud provision for the sale or purchase of securities), and
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(c) (1964) (general broker anti-
fraud provision). The plaintiffs also alleged common law fraud.
93. "In offering the new issue on March 15, 1965 to the public, the Offering Circular
referred prominently (on page 5) to 'the Sperry Rand contract,' which was an attractive feature
to the public, since the name Sperry Rand is widely known to the public as a leader in the
computer field." Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
94. See note 90 supra.
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escape liability for its own misconduct by obtaining indemnity from the issuers,
it would have less of an incentive to conduct a thorough investigation and to be
truthful in the prospectus distributed under its name, than it would be if the
indemnity was unenforceable under such circumstances? 5
Clearly Judge Mansfield based his decision on the premise that
economic sanctions encourage diligence. In the court's opinion, the
enforcement of indemnity agreements would encourage the
underwriter to rely on the information provided by the issuer, rather
than independently to verify its accuracy. There is indeed language in
the opinion which properly casts doubt on the validity of any
indemnification agreement. While the decision in Globus rested on
Blair's actual knowledge of the material omission, the policy
argument stressed by the court would seem applicable both where the
underwriter has actual knowledge and where he negligently fails to
seek out information. Since Judge Mansfield could have avoided his
discussion of public policy, it can be argued that he intended this
sweeping condemnation. Because the underwriting agreement denied
Blair & Co. indemnification for "any wilful misfeasance, bad faith, or
gross negligence," the court could easily have found that actual
knowledge was sufficient "bad faith" to prevent recovery and thus
avoided casting doubt on the negligence indemnification. It seems
likely that the language of Globus may be extended to void all
indemnificatiof agreements regardless of whether liability is based
upon actual knowledge or negligence.
In either case indemnification would clearly defeat the regulatory
policy of the Act. Since indemnification clauses cost the underwriter
nothing, he takes no financial risk of liability, and consequently, the
value of the in terrorem policy is negated. The underwriter's duty to
make a reasonable investigation into the accuracy of the entire
prospectus is alleviated, since the effect of an indemnification
provision is to make the underwriter financially liable for only the
information which he personally prepares. Protection against liability
can be consistent with the policy behind section 11 only if it makes
the underwriter investigate the entire registration statement and if it
subjects him to some economic sanction if he is found liable.
B. Insurance
In addition to seeking indemnification, underwriters have
attempted to purchase liability insurance." Such policies, when
95. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
96. For a discussion of insurance against Securities Acts violations, see generally, Note,
.upra note 13, at 1427-30.
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obtained, protect the insured against all liability up to the face
amount of the policy, with certain stated exceptions. The policy
typically does not insure "any loss or liability arising by reason of
any dishonest or criminal act on the part of the Assured," and
provides that the insuror is not "liable to the Assured . . if there is
a finding in any suit of fraudulent intent on the part of the Assured
... ))1 In addition, the company will be liable only for amounts
paid in settlements to which it agrees-unless it unreasonably
withholds its consent.
Such insurance policies have become very difficult to obtain and
are quite expensive.18 The rates vary with the possibility of error in the
prospectus. One commentator thus concluded that "the criteria for
deciding whether to issue a policy and what to charge for it are the
reputation of the counsel, accountants, and underwriters involved in
the issuance.""
Liability insurance has been attacked as being just as contrary to
the policy of section 11 as indemnification agreements. Because it too
relieves the insured from all economic consequences of liability, the
argument runs, insurance, like indemnification, would induce the
insured to ignore his duty of diligence. Indeed, it is contended that
insurance may be more violative of public policy than
indemnification, because the threat of the issuer's bankruptcy no
longer affects the economic reimbursement. 0' The underwriter is
certain of his insurance protection, while he was only certain of
indemnification if the issuer remained solvent. Therefore, it is argued
that insurance is as objectionable as indemnification, since it relieves
the underwriter of the threat of economic sanctions.
It has also been contended that a distinction should be drawn
between underwriter's liability insurance purchased by the issuer and
such insurance purchased by the underwriter himself. It is conceded
that issuer-purchased insurance would be as detrimental to public
policy as indemnification agreements, for here the underwriter clearly
97. Standard policy or Seaboard Surety Co., cited in Note, supra note 13, at 1427. For a
discussion of the standard corporate directors' and officers' policy of Lloyd's of London, see
Note, Public Policy' and Directors" Liabilityr Insurance, 67 COLU.M. L. REV. 716 (1967).
98. A 1960 article stated that $1,000,000 worth of liability insurance cost $10,000 and
$3,000,000 worth cost S15,000. Wheat & Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering, 15
Bus. LAW. 539, 552 (1960). Since July of 1968, insurance rates have increased by as much as
400"e. Titm, Oct. 18, 1968, at 100. See also Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1968, at I, col. I and p. 7,
•col. 3 (Sw. ed.).
99. Note, supra note 13, at 1428.
100. Id.
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assumes no economic risk of liability. 0 1 But, it is argued, an
underwriter does assume an economic risk if he himself purchases the
insurance policy. Not only is the initial cost of the policy high, but
also subsequent insurance would be much more expensive if he were
ever found liable. He is encouraged, therefore, to be diligent. But the
weakness of this argument is that the cost to the underwriting firm
can be easily passed on to the issuer through an increase in the
underwriter's discount, as an expense initially included in the issue.02
Insurance, however, may be consistent with public policy in some
circumstances. 03 Because insurance guarantees the compensation of
the victim, it does perform a useful function. Furthermore, insurance
protects the underwriter from "a potentially overwhelming liability
emanating from a single negligent act."'0 4 Thus, if underwriter's
liability insurance could be drafted to provide a "substitute system of
sanctions," which would provide an incentive for the underwriter's
diligence, it might be permissible in a way indemnification is not,
since it would encourage adherence to the duty of care, while at the
same time providing compensation for the victim.
"Substitute sanctions" would not be difficult to devise. In the
first place, more effective regulation could be placed in the insurance
contract. At present, the insurance company will reimburse all
liability in the absence of "dishonest" conduct or a court adjudication
of fraud. The policy could, however, be worded in a way which would
deny coverage for liability based on "actual knowledge"- regardless
of whether liability is determined by suit. It should deny coverage for
"gross negligence," including failure to attempt to verify the accuracy
of the registration statement (as in BarChris). In this way, the policy
coverage itself would demand a good faith compliance with the duty
to make a reasonable investigation.
Certain other sanctions are also available. The policy could make
a certain significant amount of the liability deductible. This would
continue the underwriter's economic risk, but insure him against
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1429; Note, supra note 10, at 412.
103. Much of the following discussion is drawn from Note, supra note 13, at 1429-30. It
should be noted that that discussion was concerned with the propriety of insuring company officials,
not investment banking firms. in view of the fact that underwriters have less access to the proper
documents for independent verification than do company officials, their chances of detecting
inaccuracies in a registration statement are less, and consequently, the role of insurance for them
is greater.
104. Id. at 1429. "it is possible, for example, to envision a very large money liability
under section I I for what may seem to be a comparatively minor violation." Id. at 1420.
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crippling liability.'"' In addition, insurance could be denied after an
underwriter had once been held liable under section 11, thus further
encouraging him to be diligent. Furthermore, the cost of additional
insurance could be raised following liability, since rates are based
upon the likelihood of liability. 6 In the above ways, then, insurance
would protect the public by continuing to demand care in preparing
registration statements and in compensating victims, while at the
same time protecting the underwriters against liability which they
would be unable to meet.
Insurance can also play a helpful role when a suit is terminated
by settlement, rather than by an adjudication on the merits. Evidence
exists that part of the reason for the lack of section 11 cases is the
fact that such actions are settled. 0 7 In some situations settlement is a
means of reducing the amount of a certain liability, since it saves the
plaintiff litigation expenses and eliminates his lingering fear that he
might lose. In other instances, however, settlement may be a means of
avoiding the expense and risk of a large lawsuit by allowing the
underwriter to pay a small amount.' These two types of situations
are distinct. In the former, the underwriter clearly foresaw his breach
of duty and consequent liability. In the latter, the defendant did not
concede a breach of duty, but merely wished to avoid litigation. That
is, in the former there was fault; in the latter there may not have been
fault. In the abstract, then, settlement fines based on fault should be
borne by the party at fault without indemnification. But fines which
are not based on fault should be open to indemnification. As a
practical matter, however, the basis of settlement is never clear-the
determination of the presence or absence of fault has been eliminated.
To allow reimbursement for all settlement fines would violate
public policy. If the underwriter could settle without economic loss he
would be very reluctant to litigate. Furthermore, his eagerness to
settle would increase with the merits of the plaintiff's case, thus
105. The deductible amount could have the effect of a "fine" or set amount for liability.
The regulatory purpose to ensure that the underwriter suffer some economic sanction when
adjudged liable under § I I has led one court to term § I I as "penal." Wogahn v. Stevens, 236
Wis. 122, 294 N.W. 503 (1940). See also Douglas & Bates, supra note 12, at 177, where the
authors refer to the remedy under § II as "strictly and wholly punative."
106. This suggestion seems specious, though, since, as noted earlier, the underwriter can
cover the increased cost by raising the discount of future issues.
107. See cases cited in note 18 supra.
108. Note. supra note 13, at 1422. See also Wall St. J.. Oct. 22. 1968. at 3. col. 2-3 (Sw. ed.)
(brokerage firm Merrill. Lynch, Pierce. Fenner & Smith. Inc., trying to settle the action brought
against it by the S EC).
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defeating the purpose of the statute. But to deny recovery of all such
fines would also be unfair to the corporation who settled without
being at fault.
Insurance could solve just such a dilemma. The insurer could
serve as an "independent board of review" to determine any fault of
the underwriter because, as noted earlier, the proper insurance policy
should contain sanctions against misconduct." 9 These sanctions
should then be operative in the settlement context.
THEODORE WARREN LENZ
109. In the standard insurance policy currently in use, a court determination of fraud or
dishonesty is necessary to release the insurance company from its duties, so amounts paid in
settlement would seem to be covered by the policy. Note. supra note 13, at 1427-28.
